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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and

Appella~t,

vs.
STYLE CRETE, INC., a Utah corporation.,

case No.
10902

Defendant and Respondent.
CITATION OF NEWLY DECIDED
CASE IN SUPPORT OF POSITION
OF RESPONDENT IN POINT I OF
STYLE CRETE, INC., BRIEF

The Respondent, Style Crete Inc., pursuant to Rule 75(p) (2) U.R.C.P. submits in
connection with the Court's consideration
of the appealable issue of ":r:eplacement land"
raised by the State and discussed in Point I
of Respondent's Brief, a newly decided case,
State Road Commission v. Rowland s. Bingham,
et al, No. 10831, issued and filed by this
:
Court under the opinion of Mr. Justice Callister[
on January 23, 1968.
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"pincer" effect of the two public projects, inadequate drainage, physical and functional disutility of the building, slicing of the property into three separate parcels, proximity of
the railroad and higfovay to the building ( 11 feet from the
office area) and substantial impairment of access, air, view
and site prominence. None of these damaged factors could
in any way have been mitigated or cured by the acquiring
of other "available ground". Indeed, Style-Crete could have
purchased the neighboring Arnold Machinery land and each
and every other piece of industrial land in Salt Lake County
for that matter, and it could not have cured in the slightest,
these elements of damage which were occasioned by the
location. proximity and design of the State acquisitions.
The severance damage which evolved herein was of a
cate.'.,'.·ory seen in Southern Pacific v. Arthur and State
Road Comm. v. Ward and accordingly, the general rule of
the "before and after" was the legal measurement. Had
Style-Crete claimed that severance damage was caused by
the removal and loss of the condemned 1.99 acreage and
the consequent contraction of the remaining property, the
State's proffer could have some merit since other available
property \Vould replace the land condemned and thus cure
the .severance damage. But that hypothesis is not of this
case and it would have been flagrant and prejudicial error
if the trial court had not rejected the irrtelevant offer of
proof of the State.
POINT II.
CASES CITED BY THE STATE ARE UNAUTHORITATIVE AND DO NOT SUPPORT
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ITS CONTENTION THAT ITS PROFFER OF
AVAILABLE LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ADMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The State's reservoir of case authority, on the admissibility of its proffer of available land to replace that condemned, is limited to five decisions. Two of those decisions
are from intermediate courts and only one could be characterized as a recent view ( 1943, with the others being decided in 1847, 1886, 1900 and 1917). While they support
the position of Style-Crete herein rather than that of the
State, they deserve only limited alttention in light of development of the Utah decisions.
In Hannibal Bridge Co. v. Shaubacher, 57 Mo. 582
(1847)., St. Loui1:; v. St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co., 196 S. W.
107 (Mo. 1917), and St. Louis v. Paramount Shoe Mfg.
Co., 168 S. W. 2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943), the cost of purchasing other land was found to fully cure the severance
damage by restoring the economic unit and placing the
owner in the same position as before. The rational expressed in St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., supra, is
representative:
"But in a case where the taking of a part of a
tract which is devoted to a special use results in
large depreciation in value for that special use, the
measure of that depreciation ought to be the sum
required to be expended in order to rehabilitate the
property for such use or replace the plant in statu
quo ante capiendum; provided, of course, that rehabilitation in such manner be practicable. * * *
In cases where no available property is owned by
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him whose land is taken, the price at which other
lands adjacent equally as valuable intrinsically, as
convenient, as economical in use, and as accessible,
and which can be bought, may be shown as measuring the amount of depreciation to which the lands
damaged but nort physically taken, have been subjected" P. 112 of 197 S. W.
The Missouri cases are irrelevant in this Appeal, since
the purchase of neighboring land would not return StyleCrete to the status quo before condemnation. Nor is the
case of Illinois and St. L. R. Co. v. Switzer, et al., 117 Ill.
399 N. E. 664 ( 1886) germane since the owner there claimed
the loss of water to a mill site. The acquisition of water
from other sources would have cured the damage. And
lastly, in Gulf C. & S. F. R. v. Brugger, 59 S. W. 56 (Tex.
Civ. moo), the condemnee urged that the balance of his
economic unit of timber land had been damaged because of
the removal or loss of the condemned property. The Texas
Court held that the economic balance could be restored
through the substitution of equal replacement property. The
Brugger case is of no significance in the disposition of this
appeal.
Thus it is that the State has not sited a single decision,
treatise, or authority which would factually support the
resutt of which it asks in this appeal. The insecurirty of
that position is matched by the rather celebrated fact that
this appeal is the first time since the commencement of Interstate Highway acquisitions in 1956, where the State of
Utah has sought to apply the replacement rule in a nonagricultural taking and under facts such as the case at bar.
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POINT III.
THE STATE'S THEORY ON REPLACEMENT
RULE OF SEVERANCE DAMAGE, AS SET
OUT IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 15, IS IMPOSSIBLE OF PRACTICAL
APPLICATION.
As previously pointed out, the "replacement rule" has
no application to the facts of this case where the State condemns two trips of land in opposite directions through the
middle of an industrial operation. It was not entitled to
an instruction on "replacement land". However, the lack
of understanding which permeated the State's approach to
severance damage herein, is demonstrated by its Request
No. 15 submitted to the trial Court. In part, it provided
that with respect to determination of severance damage:
"In order for the defendant to recover such
severance damages it has the burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that as of December 28, 1965, the date of service of the summons, no
comparable land was available to it in the area
which could be substituted for the land taken or
severed. If such comparable land was available to
the defendant, proximity and severance damages
shouid total an amount representing the difference
between (1) the value of the remainder before the
taking and (2) the value of the remainder plus the
comparable land after the taking, less the cost of
the comparable land."
This requested charge is not only inconsistent ·with the
"replacement rule" under the Carlson and Co-op Security
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decisions (even assuming arguendo, that such rule were
applicable), but it is inconsistent inter se. To begin with,
the Request seeks to amalgamate the repla:::ement doctrine
within the "before and after rule" by providing that severance damage shall be the difference between the before and
after values, less the cost of the "comparable land". Such
flies in the face of the very theory of the rule which the
State advocates is pertinent. State Road Comm. v. Co-op
Security holds that if the replacement rule is applicable,
severance damage in the traditional sense cannot be recovered:
"Where there is other comparable land available to the condemnee that would accomplish the
same use to which the land taken had been put ---,
swic1rincc damages are not available to one refusing to accept such land;" (Emphasis added) P. 180
of 1U.2d.
Further, the Utah cases provide that if the replacement doctrine is relevant, the cost of acquiring the substitute land is the measure of severance damage. Request No.
15 of Plaintiff, in directing that the cost of purchase shall
be deducted from the before and after values of the remainder, charges the property owner with the expense of acquiring the same. In other words, the owner,
when faced with a partial-taking of his ground, should pay
from his own pocket without reimbursement, the purchase
price necessary to obtain replacement land. Nearly 2 acres
of Style-Crete land was condemned but the State contends
that the 10 acres of replacement land should be purchased
by Style-Crete. If the 1.99 acre were reasonably worth
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$5,000.00 and the cost of the ten acres had been $30,000.00,
Instruction No. 15 would require that the $30,000.00 be deducted from the severance damage award. Not even the
wildest stretch of the replacement rule under Carlson and
Co-op Security would permit such a grotesque result. It
offends not only the time honored rules of just compensation, but due process of law as well. It is not surprising
that Appellant fails to cite one case in support of Request
No.15.
Requested Instruction 15 would further advise the jury
that the replacement land should be "substituted for the
land taken or severed". Such is inconsistent with the re·
mainder of the instruction with respect to the assessment
of the value of the remaining property, before and after
condemnation, since the before and after values, under the
State's theory of replacement, would be one and the same.
Request No. 15, which is the net result of the State's
Appeal, is incongruous, ambiguous and almost incomprehensible. It is impossible of practical application, much the
less consistent in theory.
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFF'S CONCEPT OF SEVERANCE
DAMAGES IN EMINENT DOMAIN IS ERRONEOUSLY CONCEIVED.
The synthesis of Plaintiff's argument on severance
damages is set out in pages 23 and 39, paragraph 1, of its
Brief. It is urged therein that with respect to severance
damage, "the owner is entitled only to an amount repre-
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senting the damage actually done to the land * * *
and suffered." And that there is "a subsitantial distinction
between compensation for land taken and damages to property not taken". Conceivably, Plaintiff contends that there
must be a physical invasion or eroding-away of the remaining property, and that severance damage is of an inferior
rank to compensation payable for land taken.
Such argument, while popular some 200 years ago, has
long gone by the board, particularly under the Constitution,
Statutes, and case decisions in Utah. Art. I Sec. 22 in providing that "private property shall not be taken or damaged
without just compensation'', makes no distinction between
the quality of recovery for severance damage, vis-a-vis, a
taking. Neither is 78-34-10, U. C. A. 1953 discriminatory
in favor of a taking and against severance damage. And
this Court in a host of decisions, has used the same test for
severance damage as it has for a taking, i.e., market value.
State Road Comm. v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917
(1963): Southern Pacific v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d
693 (1960); State Road Comm. v. Co-op Security Corp.,
supra; San Pedro A. L. & S. L. R. Co. v. Salt Lake City
Boa.rd of Education, 35 Utah 13, 99 Pac. 263 (1909).
While there may be a contest as to whether a paticular element of severance damage is compensable, once the
issue is resolved in favor of compensability, the standard
of compensation is market value. Weber Basin Conserv.
Dist., v. Nelson, 11 U. 2d 253, 358 P. 2d 81 (1960).
The State claims that an owner must mitigate his damage in eminent domain. But the replacement theory which
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the State urges herein would not miitigate Style-Crete's
severance damages. It does not, because those damages
could not be cured or mitigated, as a matter of law, by the
purchase of neighboring land. Adherence to the State's
theory \Vould only amplify that damage by requiring the
landowner to purchase ten acres of other property at a cost
of $30,000.00, which cost Style-Crete would bear. The
State's entire approach to the severance damage issue is
groundless.
POINT V.
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY AND FULLY CHARGED THE
JURY ON THE APPLICABLE LAW.
Under Point III of Appellant's Brief, it is argued that
the trial Court erred prejudicially in its charge to the jury
under Instructions 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20 and 21. The State
fails to set out the entire instruction in any instance but
attempts to rely on error relating to capitalization, punctuation and phrases which counsel has severed from the context. No claim of error runs to any genuine issue of substantive law and in no instance did the State request a difference charge, other than Instruction No. 15. Furthermore, while the State devotes considerable time to argument on Nos. 4, 12 and 20, it took no exception to either of
those instructions at trial, (R. 937-938), so it is forecloseJ
of opportunity to make an initial complaint in this Court.
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 U. 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185 (1954).

Instruction No. 4 (R. 19) : Although no exception was
taken to No. 4, the State's objection is typical of its failure
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to recognize in this case the constitutional mandate and
statutory method for assessment of damages in eminent domain. The instruction, (used time and again in the Districts of Utah, including Federal actions) charges the jury
on the fundamental ordinances upon which this case rests,
the Constitution. The objections of the State, i.e., that No.
4 is better reserved for a "civic's class since it directs the
jury's attention away from the issues being tried," disputes
the law itself as enunciated by this Court in State Road
Comm. v. Noble, 6 U. 2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495 (1957):
"Just compensation means that the owners
must be put in as good a position money wise as
they would have occupied had their property not
b~en taken."
The Sbte's theory runs aground the same view expressed by the United States Supreme Court in U. S. v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 87 L. Ed. 336 (1942).

Instruction No. 8 (R. 23) : The State claims that this Instruction is a commentary of the Court upon the weight
and effect of the evidence. In no sense is it that. The purpose of the Instruction was twofold; one, it defined clearly
the factors under the evidence that could be taken into consideration in determining severance damage, and two, it
presented, without comment, the theory of the landowner
on severance damage. Both functions are properly the exercise of the trial Court in Utah. Anderson v. Nixon, 104
Utah 262, 139 P. 2d 216 (1943); Morrison v. Perry, 104
Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772 (1943); Beckstrom v. Williams, 3
U. 2d 210, 282 P. 2d 309 (1955). Charge No. 8 did not suggest, expressly or impliedly, the feelings, of the trial judge,

34
as Instruction No. 1, had already told the jury that the
court "neither forms, has or expresses any opinion or judgment" as to ithe issues of fact. Nor did the Instruction direct the jury to consider the factors of severance damage,
the phrase, "you may take into account" having been used.
This Court has held that each party to a law suit is entitled
to have his theory submitted to the jury by an appropriate
instruction if there is evidence to support it. Webb v.
Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P. 2d 114 (1942).

Instruction No. 10 (R. 25) : Charges that the value of the
remaining property of Style-Crete after the condemnation
acquisition, should be considered as one propel'ty although
in three separate parts. Plaintiff claims that it cannot find
"any support in the cases for the proposition". If State of
Utah v. Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956) is not
sufficient support, State of Utah v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265
P. 2d 630 (1953), State Road Comm. v. Noble, 8 U. 2d 405,
335 P. 2d 831 (1959) and State Road Comm. v. Hansen, 14
U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963) should be. They all state
that the property is to be evaluated in its then existent condition with the test being what one buyer would pay to one
seller, and not what three or more buyers may pay to one
seller. The test is as applicable to the after value as it is to
the before value and the decisions have never carved out a
distinction between the two in the approach to value. The
State's plea that Instruction No. 10 could result in an owner
realizing a "profit" on the sale of the remaining property
is unworthy of comment. The Instruotion properly states
the law of the case.
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lnstmction No. 11 (R. 2G), defines a comparable sale, in
the legal sense, un<ler the decisions of this Court in State
v. Peek, s11,pm, Southern Pacific v. Arthur, supra, Weber
Basfo Consnv. Dist. V. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862
( 1950) and State Road Comrn. v. Peterson, supra. It is an
instruction originally drafted by the Office of the Attorney
General in 1959, it has been used by the Road Commission
and landowners alike in the bulk of condemnation litigation
in the last eight years, and it is now considered a stock instruction by most trial judges in this State. It does not at
all charge the jury to weigh any particular sale or one sale
against another. Instead, it defines the rudiments of a comparable transaction of which the trial Court has the responsibility. It is of no difference than charging the jury on the
elements of the "reasonable prudent man" in a negligence
suit.
Instruction No. 12 (R. 27) : The single exception of the
State is to the use of the words "fairly and reasonably"
in the Instruction. There is no merit to the objection. Having- taken no exception at all to the Instruction in the trial
Court, the State may not be heard on the objection for the
first time on appeal. Patton v. Evans, 92 Utah 524, 69 P.
2d 969 (1937).
Instruction No. 19 (R. 34), of which the State "laments",
is of stock variety and has been used over again in
eminent domain trials in this State. It charges that
an owner may not stand 'in the way of a Government
improvement by refusing to sell his property. That is a
correct statement of the law. Barnes V. Wade, 90 Utah 1,
58 P. 2d 297 (1936). The statement that the owner is to
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be paid "justly and fairly" for the condemned property
needs no citation. The best that State's counsel can do with
this charge is to say that it was "inflammatory, loaded"
and contained unnecessary capitalization of words. The
objection is against this Court's definition of just compensation and is unworthy of belief. Significantly, Plaintiff
does not refer the Court to a case in point that would justify a finding of prejudicial error.

Instruction No. 21 (R. 36) : This Instruction advised the
jury that its verdict may be within the range of the testimony submitted by the parties as the weight of the evidence
fairly reflects. State counsel argues that while the charge
"is not particularly harmful", this Court should nevertheless reverse and declare that in an eminent domain case, a
verdict may exceed or be less than the testimony of the
parties on land value and damages, all dependent upon the
whims of the jury. Such contention ignores the rule of this
Court announced in fVeber Basin Conserv. Dist. v. Moore,
2 U. 2d 254, 272 P. 2d 176 (1954), Weber Basin Conserv.
Dist. v. Skeen, 8 U. 2d 79, 328 P. 2d 730 (1958) and Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Keller Corp., 15 U. 2d 318, 392 P. 2d
620 (1964). In Skeen, the Court remitted a jury verdict on
severance damages which exceeded the expert testimony of
the landowner. Under the theory of State's counsel herein,
the Skeen case was decided improperly by this Court. Instruction No. 21 accurately presents the rule of the case.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN
EXCLUDING THE WRITTEN APPRAISAL REPORT OF THE STATE'S VALUE WITNESS,
SOLOMON.
The claim of the State in Point IV of its Brief, page
37, that the trial Court erroneously excluded an offer of the
written appraisal report of the State value witness, Mr.
Solomon, is ludicrous. It is elementary trial practice in this
jurisdiction that a written report of an appraisal witness
is not evidence of the facts in issue and while the report
may be referred to by the witness to refresh his mtemlory,
it may not be admitted in evidence. Such is the general evidentiary rule, U. S. v. Rapzyy, 157 F. 2d 964 (2d Cir. 1946);
5 Nichols on Eminent Dornain, 129 Sec. 18.1 (1). The State
suggests that because counsel for Style-Crete on cross examination, requested to see the notes of the State appraiser
and thereafter proceeded with cross examination as to the
witness' opinion given on direct, that the door is thus opened for the admissibility of an entire written appraisal report on redirect examination. If that were the rule, it
would be difficult if not impossible to conduct a cross examination of an appraiser without having his written report (prepared outside of the courtroom and containing all
sorts of inadmissible statements and conclusions) received
in evidence on redirect.
State's counsel on redirect examination of Mr. Solomon, offered his entire appraisal report as Exhibit P-33,
although cross examination had only touched upon a frac-
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tion of its contents. The objection was made that the report
was not the best evidence of the witness' opinion, that the
proffer constituted an emphasis of a particular part of the
witness' testimony, that the State had already submitted a
large written sheet showing the computations and value
conclusions of the witness and that Defendant's counsel had
not, by requesting to see the notes of the witness on cross
examination, placed in issue the evidential significance of
the notes (R. 845-846). The objection was properly sustained by the trial judge.
POINT VII.
THE POSITION OF THE STATE ON APPEAL
AND AT TRIAL IS INCONSISTENT WITH ITS
OWN TESTIMONY BY WHICH IT IS BOUND.
The State has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. The verdict and judgment
are substantially supported by the predominate weight of
the evidence. In fact, much of the State's testimony corroborated that of Style-Crete.
Part of the State's difficulty at trial lay in its misinterpretation of Style-Crete's proof of damages. With respect to the vibration testimony, for example, Style-Crete
introduced evidence as to the probable effects upon the
building from the vibration of high speed trains. The purpose of that evidence was not to show the existence of
actual vibration in connection with a business loss, but to
show an important condition probably resulting from condemnation which would affect the thinking of the buyer and

seller as to the market value of the remammg property.
Yet from the approach of the State to Style-Crete's vibration testimony and, indeed from the Commission's own evidence, it is apparent that the State thought it was trying a
dam,1ge vibration case against a railroad and that the triable issue was whether there was, in fact, actual and sustained vibration damage. The State's approach overlooked
the fact that market value and not vibration was the ultimate and triable issue.
Further, Mr. Solomon, the State's only value witness,
stated unequivocally that the remaining property and building would be depreciated in value due to the (a) location of
the nine foot railroad and highway fill in front and along
side of the building, (b) the trapping of normal run off
water by the fill, ( c) taking of the septic tank drainage
field, (d) loss of parking space, (e) loss of visibility, (f)
impairment of access and (g) loss of special features of the
plant itself (R. 726-729). He further testified that in his
opinion, the vibration from the railroad would likely have a
detrimental effect on the value of the remaining property so
that it could no longer be used for cast stone or close tolerance manufacturing. The State thereafter, attempted to impeach Mr. Solomon's testimony through the use of two
other witnesses, Messrs. Pickett and Wilde. Pickett had
experience only in massive concrete structures such as
bridges, and none in cast stone (R. 863-864). Wilde admitted that after cast stone once has set up, vibration thereafter would weaken the product (R. 855).
In closing argument to the jury, counsel for the State
argued in substance that:
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"Mr. Solomon did a conscientious job and he
tried to be very fair to the defendant, but in view
of the fact that he based his opinion of after value
on some assumptions as to vibrations which are not
correct, even his appraisal of the value of the property after the taking was too low. I believe you
would be justified in disregarding his erroneous
assumptions which were favorable to the defendant
and find that the value of the property after the
taking was considerably greater than what he considered it to be, and that the damages suffered by
the defendant were substantially less than the figure stated in the opinion given by Mr. Solomon."
(R. 920-923). 6

It seems rather ironic that the State would call as its
only expert on value, a witness who followed the State's instructions to appraise the property under the "before and
after rule" only to have State's counsel impeach and discredit his testimony on closing argument. Certainly it is
inconsistent with what this Court said in Weber Basin Conserv. Dist. v. Skeen, 8 U. 2d 79, 328 P. 2d 730 (1958) :

"A party cannot call a witness to testify and
then select only that testimony favorable to his
cause, ignoring that which is unfavorable."
The verdict and judgment stand fully supported by
the evidence.
CONCLUSION
While the facts in this case presented serious issues of
substantial dispute, the questions of law were relatively unAt the hearing on the State's motion for new trial, the undisputed
affidavit set forth above was stricken, but the affidavit should be considered in weighing the merits of the State's Appeal herein.
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complicated for an eminent domain suit, until ithe State
raised the replcement land theory of severance ·damage.
There is no room for that theory under the facts of this
case and to hold otherwise, would be to upset the precedent
developed in this jurisdiction of the last thirty years or
more. The ruling of the trial Court rejecting the replacement theory of severance damage should be upheld by this
Court. The general rule of the before and after is the only
principle which fits the facts of this case.
The objections of the State to the trial Court's charge
to the jury are unwarranted and contrary to the decisions
of this Court. The trial Court gave all of the State's Re-quests for instructions except No. 15 on the irrelevant
theory of "replacement land".
A just and fair verdict was returned after eight days
of trial fully supported by the evidence. The judgment of
just compensation entered on the verdict should be affirmed and the Plaintiff's motion for a new trial should
be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.,
520 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah,
PAUL E. REIMANN,
500 Kennecott Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah,

Attorneys for Respondent,
Style Crete, Inc.
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